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ARE VIABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY IRRECONCILABLE AIMS?

by

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Master's Essay
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

DEMOCRACY 3

FOREIGN POLICY 12

VIABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY 26

CONCLUSION 40

BIBLIOGRAPHY 42

INTRODUCTION

> ...it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments appear to me to be decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different principles. ...Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient...a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience.[1]

Viable democratic government and effective foreign policy are irreconcilable aims in the absolute, in the extreme, and in the ultimate projection. Perfect viability of a democratic government and perfect efficacy of foreign policy are mutually exclusive aims since the prerequisites of one are antithetical to the prerequisites of the other. The problem posed, however, is not considered to be taken in the absolute, nor is it expected that a distinctly positive or negative stand is desired. Rather, the question is believed to be a springboard from which can be launched an inquiry concerned with the relationship of effective foreign policy to a viable democratic government. For the purposes of this inquiry, the writer will take the position that a democratic government, vis-a-vis other forms of government, has inherent disadvantages in the formulation and execution of effective foreign policy.

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[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 160-161.

At the outset, the writer desires to make clear that he is a staunch proponent of democracy as both a way of life and a form of government and would not see either sacrificed to the altar of efficiency or effectiveness. His contention is that the founders of a democratic government are aware of its weaknesses in the field of international relations, but choose to place individual rights, liberties and freedoms in a paramount position, sacrificing, if necessary, the government's potential strength on the international level.

As stated this study will be an inquiry into the relationship between a democratic government and effective foreign policy. It is beyond the scope of the inquiry, and the writer's abilities, to recommend a panacea for this dichotomous relationship.

In organization and methodology, this inquiry is divided into three major sections. The first deals with the concept of democracy, its raison d'etre, types, principles, definition, and values. This, in turn, is followed by a discussion of the American application of democratic principles to its form of government. The second section is concerned with foreign policy, its place within a government, its types, bases, and purposes. American foreign policy is then examined with particular emphasis upon its formulation. Thirdly, the American experience is used to reveal the innate disadvantages of a democracy in formulating and carrying out an effective foreign policy.

DEMOCRACY

Government is an instrument whereby the authority or sovereignty of a group of people is represented and exercised through agencies and institutions for the formulation and execution of the peoples' will. Within that grouping of people--the state--government is intended to protect members from each other and from other groupings of people. In attempting to do this, governments take many diverse forms, from anarchy, or absence of government, to totalitarianism, or complete governmental control and hegemony over all persons and activities within the state.

Aristotle classified government according to the number of people who participated in its affairs and set forth both good and perverted governments. The good government of one-man rule is monarchy, the perversion is tyranny; the good government of the rule of few is aristocracy, the perversion, oligarchy; the good of the rule of the many is polity, the perversion, mobocracy. His classification, while useful in the broadest terms, is descriptive rather than analytical, for all governments, in day-to-day operation, are of the few. A better means of classification would appear to be one based upon the location or distribution of sovereignty. In anarchy, each individual retains his individual sovereignty. Under totalitarianism, no individual retains sovereignty, and the totalitarian leader usurps the individual sovereignty of all members of the state. Between these extremes of the political spectrum would reside the diverse

forms of government mentioned above. Democracy, however, cannot, with validity, be placed in one location within the political spectrum, for there are widely divergent democratic theories on the location and distribution of sovereignty. Witness the proliferation of "Modified" democracies existing today: Totalitarian Democracy, Peoples' Democracy, Proletarian Democracy, Guided Democracy, Plebiscitary Democracy, Bourgeoisie Democracy, Athenian Democracy, Social Democracy, Pure Democracy, and Direct Democracy to name a few.

Thus democracy means many things to many people and is virtually subject to individual interpretation as to its "real" meaning. Further, it is frequently used in connotations which transcend the political realm, such as, "democratic way of life," etc. When thus used, it assumes an emotional mantle that defies description or classification.

Notwithstanding its extrapolitical connotations, there are certain characteristics or principles of democracy which are almost universally valid (absolute universally-valid principles would be so all-encompassing that their value in any investigation would be useless). Perhaps the first principle should be majority rule, and its attendant minority protection. Normally the decision of the majority is reflected through representatives and implies the consultation and consent of the majority of the electorate.

Secondly, the political status of all members of the state, with reference to their voting equality, is generally considered an intrinsic principle of democracy. The franchise is equally distributed without regard to race, color, creed, wealth, social position, or education among all adult members of the state so that the policy-makers, in forms of government mentioned above. Democracy, however, seems, [illegible], to attach to one function which the political [illegible], for there are widely divergent [illegible] theories as to the location and distribution of sovereignty. Witness the proliferation of "Democratic" democracies existing today: Totalitarian Democracy, Peoples' Democracy, [illegible] Democracy, Guided Democracy, [illegible] Democracy, Bureaucratic Democracy, Liberal Democracy, Social Democracy, Pure Democracy, and Direct Democracy to name a few.

This democracy meant many things to many people [illegible] [illegible] individual freedom [illegible] "[illegible]" [illegible]. Further, it is frequently used in connotations which [illegible] the [illegible] such as, "democratic way of life," etc. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

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exercise of a portion of an individual's sovereignty, can give expression to his will.

Herein lies a third characteristic of most democracies and that is direct popular control over policy-makers and their actions, by periodic elections, and indirect control, through representation, normally exercised through the institution and position of a legislature. One writer on this subject has said:

> The difference between an authoritarian and a democratic state centers on the position of the representative body. If the Legislature is free and strong, authoritarian rule cannot exist. Without it, there can be no democratic government. Subject only to the sovereign people, the Legislature must have the ultimate power in a democracy.[2]

A fourth principle of democracies emanates from the relationship between the people and the policy-makers and is that the individual must have the political freedom to exercise effectively his collective control over policy-makers by means of organization, usually in the form of political parties and political communications.

One further characteristic of a democracy which bears mention is that all actions within the state, from the expression of majority rule to the maintenance of internal order, are designed to be peaceable and to avoid violence.

These five characteristics or principles, then, constitute a description of most democracies and provide a basis from which a viable definition of a democratic government may be derived. The writer of this essay is unable to improve upon that rendered by H.B. Mayo who states:

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[2] Thomas K. Finletter, Can Representative Government Do The Job? (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1945), p. 13.

> A democratic political system is one in which public policies are made, on a majority basis, by representatives subject to effective control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under conditions of political freedom.[3]

From the principles which serve as the basis for the above definition flow certain values which are characteristic of a democracy. From the principle of avoidance of violence come the values of peaceful change and the voluntary settlement of disputes through a minimum of coercion and force. From these and from the principle of popular control over policy-makers comes the value of the orderly and peaceful succession of leaders. Further, from the principles of political equality and freedom come one of the core values of a democracy: Justice must be applied equally to even the most pluralistic groupings within the state.

These principles and values, taken together, delimit the general, all-encompassing meaning of the term "democracy" and begin to narrow its interpretation to an Anglo-Saxon conception. However, because the term is still so amorphous, one must further limit its connotations and choose a political moment and location in time in order to investigate its composition and institutions. As his democratic plane of reference, the writer chooses the American experience with democratic government.

American democracy has historically been characterized by two major political devices, majority rule and civil rights. Majority rule has already been mentioned. Civil rights, as used by the writer, embrace those individual rights which require protection from encroachment by both the government itself and by other individuals within the state. The

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[3] H.B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 70.

basic American civil rights are delineated in, but not limited to, the Bill of Rights and amendments XIII, XIV, and XV of the United States Constitution. Democratic thought in America has primarily concerned itself with two internal political relationships: that of the individual to the State and of individuals to one another. External relationships and security were presumed guaranteed by insular isolation, the Pax Britannica, and weak continental neighbors.

The Founding Fathers considered that individuals could be adequately protected from one another by the mere existence of government, legislation, and law enforcement. Their primary concern centered on the relationship between the individual and the State and they championed the paramountcy of the individual. In order to protect his freedoms, they purposely limited the powers of government:

> It was with this purpose in mind that the American Constitution divided authority between the States and the Federal Government, and within the latter, among executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Federalism and the separation of powers were deliberately designed to keep all governments--and especially the National Government--weak.[4]

Thus from the birth of the American democratic experience, institutional safeguards were adopted in order to restrain the powers of government and protect individual rights. In addition to the separation of powers and checks and balances mentioned above, the framers of the Constitution entrusted specific powers to the Federal government with the stipulation that all reserved powers belonged to the individual states and their inhabitants.

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[4] John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), pp. 4-5.

As a result of these constitutional compromises, an American federal government emerged which was structurally unique in the world. Federalism divided powers between the states and the central government. Within the federal government, powers were further divided among the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary, with a system of checks and balances that was intended to preclude the dominance of one branch or a tyrannical majority. Further, although the President alone heads the executive branch and represents the nation, both the legislative and judicial branches contain [illegible] evidence of [illegible] [illegible]. The legislature is marked not only by its bicameralism but by the plurality of political parties, interest groups, regional interests, and [illegible] [illegible]; in the Judiciary, [illegible] [illegible] is [illegible] in the [illegible] and diversity of the Supreme Court members.

Having briefly discussed the constitutional structure of the American federalist government, the author will proceed to discuss the delegated powers, and divisions of power among the branches.

As previously mentioned, the American states are guaranteed that the [illegible] not specifically given to the federal government. In addition, by the Constitution, the rights and privileges of citizens of each state are protected from encroachment by other states. New states entering the United States enter equal [illegible] with other states, and each state is guaranteed a republican form of government.

The [illegible] enumerated in the federal Constitution are general. Only those powers which were thought to be necessary for the accomplishment of functions [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] unity or [illegible]. These specific powers are [illegible] in the Con-

the Government and the people.[15] Further, these problems of coordination can take place on three levels: institutional discord, partisan controversies, and individual, personal animosities between key individuals.

Coordination within the executive branch is made difficult by the tremendous proliferation of foreign policy functions and responsibilities in recent years as a result of the widening scope of governmental activities and the international position of the United States. Agencies which historically handled foreign policy have been reorganized and enlarged. New agencies have been created and other agencies have, since World War II, for the first time, acquired foreign policy functions.

Since a thorough inquiry of foreign policy coordination in the executive branch would require a study at least of equal magnitude to this essay, only the most significant problems are herein discussed.

The President attempts to coordinate foreign policy among his departments and independent agencies through the Executive Office of the President which includes the White House Office, the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency. He also makes wide use of interdepartmental committees to effect coordination.

Outside of the President himself, the most important executive institution for the conduct of foreign relations is the Department of State, headed by the Secretary of State. State Department coordination of foreign policies takes place on both institutional and personal levels in

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[15] The Brookings Institution, Governmental Mechanism for the Conduct of United States Foreign Relations, p. 1.

three executive-branch relationships: the first is between the Secretary and the President, which is largely determined by individual personalities. Whereas John Foster Dulles was given a virtual free rein in the conduct of foreign relations, Dean Rusk has an obvious subordinate role to the incumbent President. The second relationship is between the Department of State and other executive departments. Whereas State attempts to provide departmental-level foreign policy coordination, its own substantive interests and activities preclude complete success. The third relationship is within the Department itself, between functional and geographic bureaux, between the Foreign Service Officers and the Civil Service specialists, and between those who make policy and those who explain policy. State Department efficacy in foreign policy, then, is conditional upon the resolution of many diverse factors.

International and especially United States concern with security has resulted in the emergence of the Department of Defense as a vital institution in the field of foreign relations. In many ways, this emergence represents a digression from the moralistic approach to foreign policy which the writer intends to criticize below. It does not, however, completely remove the basis for that criticism. The Defense Department is subject to the same divisive and fragmenting general relationships that plague State. Moreover, the Department of Defense's intradepartmental coordination is made even more difficult by both the individual and collective roles played by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further there exists the continuing problem of civil-military relations.

Presented here are only two executive departments concerned with foreign policy. In addition to the other departments and agencies

Most commodity-group organizations. The same is true of relations between the Secretary and the President, which is largely determined by individual personalities. Whereas John Foster Dulles was given a almost free rein in the conduct of foreign relations, Dean Rusk has an obvious subordinate role to the incumbent President. The second relationship is between the Department of State and other executive departments. Whereas State attempts to provide governmental-level foreign policy coordination, its own individuality interests and activities preclude complete success. The third relationship is within the Department itself, between functional and geographic bureaus, between the Foreign Service Officers and the Civil Service specialists, and between those who make policy and those who execute policy. State Department efficacy in foreign policy, then, is conditioned upon the cooperation of other diverse forces.

Internationalist and especially United States concern with security has resulted in the emergence of the Department of Defense as a major institution in the field of foreign relations. In many ways, this development represents a digression from the moralistic approach to foreign policy which the writer intends to criticize below. It does not, however, completely remove the issue to this question. The Defense Department is subject to the same internal and frequently general relationships that plague State. Moreover, the Department of Defense's departmental constitution is made even more difficult to link the functional and calibration roles played by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further there exists the continuing problem of civil-military relations.

[illegible] are only two executive departments concerned with foreign policy. In addition to the other departments and agencies tangentially influential, McCamy, writing in 1950, counted some 130 subsidiary interagency committees concerned with various phases of American foreign policy.[16] The writer contends that even the diffusion of power within the executive branch of government, and its resultant lack of unity and coordination in the field of foreign relations, is at least partially a result of the democratic fear of overcentralization and the tyranny of one-man rule.

The second major problem is that of the coordination within the Legislature. Whereas partisan controversies have only a minor position in executive coordination, they become, with institutional discord, the major factors creating legislative disunity and decentralization.

Institutional discord may be further divided into organizational and procedural factors. One organizational factor: contributing to disunity is the existence of two houses of Congress with differing responsibilities, representation, composition, and tenure. A second is that of partisan distribution and composition and a third is the relationship of members of Congress to the public.

Procedural factors include problems of coordination and jurisdiction among standing policy committees and between these standing policy committees and appropriations committees. Two further procedural factors contribute to Congressional disunity in foreign policy. The first is party discipline. The reliance placed by many writers on the benefits of bipartisanship in foreign affairs appears, to the writer, to be a condemnation of partisan politics "beyond the water's edge." If this is so, then it is a rejection of party discipline in foreign affairs, within the

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[16] James L. McCamy, The Administration of American Foreign Affairs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 146.

Legislature. Strangely enough, then, members of Congress are criticized both for their party solidarity and their political independence. To this writer, transgression of party platforms is more frequent in the majority party than in the minority, which has a tendency toward unity. These majority transgressions encourage disunity and fragmentation.

The second and final procedural factor is that of the sectional, minority, and particular pressures emanating from a Congressman's constituency. Especially preceding elections is this an important factor in determining legislative action in foreign policy.

These institutional and partisan factors create what Cheever and Haviland call a "Congress bogged down in a morass of complexities without sufficient discipline, skilled analysis, or coordination to do its job adequately" in foreign affairs.[17]

Coordination between the Executive and the Legislature constitutes the third major problem area in foreign policy arising from the system of separation of powers and checks and balances.

Cheever and Haviland state that "...under our system of government, the executive-legislative relationship is the weakest link in our foreign-policy chain."[18] Finletter, further, claims that this weak relationship is endemic:

> ...the American system is so constituted that it produces a conflict between the Executive and Congress every time the Executive tries to be positive and strong. You cannot

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[17] Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr., American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 208.

[18] Ibid., p. 164.

> have a government capable of handling the most difficult problems that peace-time democracy has ever faced with the two main parts of it at each other's throats.[19]

Problems of executive-legislative coordination take place on three levels. The first of these is institutional discord, resulting from both formal and informal internal factors previously discussed. Institutional discord has recently taken on new importance with the growing need for legislation and appropriations to support foreign policy. On his side, the Executive represents foreign policy formulation and execution through the Departments of State and Defense. In addition, he controls the data and intelligence upon which foreign policy must be based. The President, further, represents the closest approach to unity in the field of foreign affairs. On the other hand, the Legislature holds the purse strings for foreign policy implementation and execution. It has the power to accept or reject treaties and appointments and the power to declare war. Congress through its representative role is the principal instrument of democratic control over Executive actions in foreign affairs. However, as a result of its representative character, its mechanism for influencing foreign policies is highly decentralized and diversified.

Since the Executive and the Legislature have both independent and co-jurisdictional powers in foreign affairs, discord arises as to which branch will enjoy leadership, greater influence and control in foreign policy formulation. The President has an obligation to determine objectives which are in the National Interest and Congress has an obligation to preserve popular control over vital decisions of the Federal government. The lack of a clear dividing line between the two invites competition between the

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[19] Thomas K. Finletter, op. cit., p. 9.

two branches over foreign policy decisions. Nor can this competition, and resultant discord, be eliminated from a democratic government, for giving the Executive power to dictate to Congress would result in authoritarianism and giving the Legislature power to dictate to the President would result in divided and impotent government.

In addition to these architectural divisions, a problem of coordination is raised by partisan controversies. Especially when the Executive and a majority of the Legislature are of differing political parties, but even when a President has a majority in Congress, his foreign policies are frequently attacked by members of the opposition party hoping to reap partisan benefits.

Finally, foreign policy coordination often suffers as a result of personal animosities between the President and Congressional leaders, particularly, but not limited to, members of the opposition party.

Thus the institutional, partisan, and personality barriers to effective executive-legislative coordination preclude the formulation and execution of well-integrated, adequately-implemented foreign policies. There is in the United States government no central authority for the coordination of these many diverse influences and powers affecting the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

A fourth relationship which constitutes an obstacle to the formulation of effective foreign policy is that of coordination between the government and the people. As has been noted, one of the cornerstones of a democracy is that governmental policy-makers and their actions must be subject to popular control, either directly, through elections or indirectly, through representation. Moreover, with the improvements in modern communications, policy-makers are subjected to virtual day-to-day public

influences and opinion.

A major difficulty emerging in any discussion of the "public" or "public opinion" is a definition of terms, for "public" in both senses challenges precise definition. "Public" is considered by some to mean the aggregate population as a continuum existing through time. To others, it implies the point-in-time, "man-in'the-street" opinion and to still others, it is the power elites who actually bring influence to bear on policy-makers and their actions. To this writer, "public" equals the total population. In respect to foreign policy, the public is divided into two groups: a knowledgeable public and an uninformed public. Kriesburg, writing about the 1946 public, conducted polls which showed that 30% of the electorate was unaware of any given event in American foreign affairs, 45% was aware but uninformed, and only 25% showed any knowledge at all.[20] Thus the writer's knowledgeable public, upon the basis of those statistics, would comprise only one-fourth of the electorate. Yet this informed public should be further divided into articulate shapers of public opinion with no personal axes to grind, such as educators, commentators, and editorial writers and organized self-interest groups desirous of effecting personally-beneficial action.

Several generalizations can be made concerning the uninformed public, with which Lippmann is concerned when he refers to the "functional derangement...between the mass of the people and the government."[21]

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[20] Martin Kriesburg, "Dark Areas of Ignorance," Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, ed. Lester Market (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 51.

[21] Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York: The New American Library, 1955), p. 19.

The uninformed American public is largely reactive, lethargic, moralistic, and "wants quick results; it will sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit for today's apparent advantage."[22] This is the public most easily swayed by governmental public relations but it is also the public least-effectively represented in policy-making.

To this writer, the only public that contributes positively to the formulation and execution of American foreign policies is that which is composed of the articulate leaders, hoping to recommend objectives and policies in the National Interest. The influence of the self-interested division of the knowledgeable public appears to be most deleterious for not only is it vociferous and influential but it represents particular, minority interests which have little concern with National Interests. Unfortunately, this self-interested public, through lobbying and concerted actions, is disproportionately influential over the formulation and execution of American foreign policies.

Therefore, in the over-all relationship between the government and the people, the public represents diversified groupings in support of often-inconsistent objectives and policies, some of which are antithetical to the pursuit of the National Interests.

Thus, in each of these four relationships (coordination within the Executive, the Legislature, between Executive and Legislature, and between the government and the people) is apparent a lack of unity and concerted, coordinated action to protect and promote the National Interests.

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[22] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 146.

While this disunity and diffusion of power guarantees the perpetuation of democratic government, it is a major obstacle to the formulation and execution of effective foreign policy.

A second prerequisite of American democracy includes the avoidance of secrecy and the consultation of the people on important issues. These standards form the basis for the continued existence of a free and open society. Yet, although they are prerequisites for a democracy, they are at variance with effective foreign policy on two counts. The first is that whereas

> The survival of democracy demands that as much information as possible be made public; the survival of the nation may require that vast quantities of such information be classified as secret.[23]

Although frequently challenged by both the Legislature and the public in this regard, the Executive, as the source and controller of intelligence, must preserve the secrecy of much information. The reasons for this preservation are three-fold: first, the specific sources of much intelligence information must be protected; second, revealing all the bases for foreign policy formulation jeopardizes its effectiveness; and, third, the revelation of information prejudicial to National Security is not compatible with preservation of the National Interests.

The consultation of the public on vital issues is at variance with effective foreign policy primarily in regard to speed and decisiveness. Many foreign policies, to be effective, cannot endure the discussion and debate characteristic of public consultation. It cannot wait for public

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[23] Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1960), p. 57.

approval but must be formulated and executed by governmental officials hoping to act in the National Interests. Of this Dexter Perkins says "...the necessities of a more active and of a more decisive and swift-acting diplomacy tend to modify our constitutional forms."[24]

The third and final prerequisite of American democracy disadvantageous to the conduct of effective foreign policies is that referred to by Kennan when he states:

> ...I see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems.[25]

As discussed in the section dealing with American theoretical bases of foreign policy formulation, this legalistic-moralistic approach was a result of isolationism, continental insularity, the distrust of and distaste for European power politics, the belief in indigenous American superiority, and in the innate goodness of man--that people are good and rulers are evil. Its primary manifestation in the foreign policy field has been a divorce between force and diplomacy.

The evolution of the American divorce of power from international relations is traced by Spanier:

> Democratic...theory posits that man is a rational and moral creature, and that differences among men can be settled by rational persuasion and moral exhortation....Peace--the result of harmony among men--was thus the natural or normal state.[26]

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[24] Perkins, op. cit., p. 170.

[25] George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 95.

[26] Spanier, op. cit., p. 5.

Conflict, then, is represented as a deviation from the norm and must be a result of immoral states disregarding the harmony of interests among men. A belief in American moral superiority and international immorality are the results of this thinking. Only when its very existence is jeopardized should America project her influence into the international arena. The resultant war effort, being based upon universal moralistic principles is punitive which "...goes far to explain the difficulty we have in employing force for rational and restrictive purposes...."[27]

In comparison with the Messianic democratic war effort and the mutually-exclusive states of conflict and harmony, peacetime foreign policies are expected to preserve the harmony among men, even in an anarchic community, unsupported by force and national resources. To quote Spanier once again:

> The result of this depreciation of power and moralistic approach to foreign policy is the inability of the United States to relate military power to political objectives. Yet, only if the two are combined can a nation conduct an effective foreign policy.[28]

Here presented, then, are the three dichotomous prerequisites of viable democratic government, on the one hand, and effective foreign policy on the other. At this stage of the inquiry, the most logical question that a reader would ask is how the American experience in democratic government has been able to exist for almost two hundred years if it embraces these intrinsic barriers to the formulation and execution of effective foreign policy. The criticism is answered by the fact that only in

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[27] George F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 84.

[28] Spanier, op. cit., p. 12.

recent years has America been thrust into the international milieu and given world-wide responsibilities as a bastion of peace and freedom. As stated earlier, American external relationships and security were guaranteed by insular isolation, weak continental neighbors, and the geographic distance from the historical pivotal point of international politics. Since the Second World War and the shift of international power from its historical centers, American democracy has been put to the test.

CONCLUSION

> ...the goals and methods of policy formation cannot be stated in terms of efficiency alone, at least in a democratic society. We are committed to the idea that government in some way ought to reflect the demands of the governed. It is not enough, in other words, to achieve efficient, intelligent foreign policy if the price is the destruction of the institutions of democratic government.[29]

As a result of the dichotomy between viable democratic government and effective foreign policy, a vital question emerges: which is more important to the United States of America? The writer contends that democracy should prevail, but the trend appears in the opposite direction.

A recapitulation of those areas in which the two aims come into conflict will give weight to the allegation that American constitutional democracy is suffering as a result of modifications undertaken to pursue effective foreign policy.

In order to override the separation of powers and checks and balances instituted by the Constitution, the emergency powers of the Executive have expanded and lost much of their traditionally temporary character. As an extension of those powers, the Executive has made wide use of his power to commit the nation publicly to a course of action and to deploy the military of the United States without a declaration of war.

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[29] James N. Murray, Jr. "Foreign Policy," Functions and Policies of American Government, ed. Jack W. Peltason and James M. Burns (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p. 60.

In order to annul popular and legislative distaste for secrecy and a desire for consultation, the Executive has relied upon CIA-Type appropriations, overclassification of information, and what one writer calls "Crisis Centralization." Lasswell elaborates:

> Crisis requires rapidity of decision as a means of national security; rapidity favors centralized final decision; centralization favors the exercise of effective power by a self-perpetuating few. As crisis continues demand for democratic process grows weaker, and popular government passes into oligarchy, absolutism, or tyranny.[30]

In order to overcome the legalistic-moralistic approach of democracy, the Executive has relied upon both crisis centralization and the universal fears of cultural and biological extinction.

> Some have even wondered whether the American democracy is congenitally incapable of carrying out sustained and effective foreign policies in the midst of recurrent international crises, within a domestic environment of chronic citizen apathy and lack of understanding of complex external problems...Communist policy-makers are unhampered by such potentially divisive factors....They therefore possess an enormous advantage over the United States and other democratic governments with respect to ability to formulate long-range diplomatic objectives....[31]

The dilemma of whether to preserve democratic values or effective foreign policy makes decisions difficult. Without sacrificing our democratic values to a form of authoritarianism, the writer has no solution.

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[30] Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Power and Democratic Values," Problems of Power in American Democracy, ed. Arthur Kornhauser (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957), p. 58.

[31] Crabb, op. cit., p. 125.

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